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Introduction 
 
The MIT Engineering Systems Division is currently building its intellectual framework.  
There is not yet consensus within ESD as to which tools and methods are central to the 
nascent engineering systems approach; which questions it should address; or the extent to 
which qualitative approaches should be incorporated into it.  The goal of this paper is to 
sharpen the debate by presenting multiple analyses of a single engineering system.  
Presenting varying perspectives illuminates issues such as: 
 
• What types of questions should engineering systems practitioners ask when 
analyzing problems? 
• Which tools are fundamental, which are peripheral, and which lie outside its 
purview? 
• Is there a trade-off between the analytical rigor of different tools and the degree to 
which they can address questions the approach considers important? 
• Does this approach suggest generalizable principles for analyzing engineering 
systems? 
 
This paper uses national missile defense (NMD) as the analytical vehicle for this 
approach.  By any definition, NMD is an engineering system.  Moreover, the complexity 
of NMD facilitates the framing of analyses on multiple levels, and provides a mechanism 
for exploring the ramifications of different potential definitions of “engineering systems” 
as a discipline.  Finally, the issue is policy-relevant.  The United States is currently 
deciding how to build and deploy NMD; the choice of system architectures may have 
important cost, foreign policy, military readiness, and domestic political ramifications.  
While there is considerable descriptive information about system components, there is 
little hard data in the open literature regarding system performance and costs.  This paper 
draws upon the available literature, while making estimates where necessary.   
 
It is important to state at the outset that this paper assumes two key (and often-disputed) 
points.  First, it is assumed that technologies under development will be feasible.  Second, 
it is assumed that adversaries may build intercontinental ballistic missiles and equip them 
with weapons of mass destruction (in addition to Russia and China, who already possess 
them).  The paper therefore should be read as a vehicle for exploring issues at the heart of 
engineering systems rather than as a policy analysis. 
 
Outline 
 
This body of this paper consists of five perspectives on the NMD problem: 
 
• Technical description and “what-if” probabilistic analysis 
• CLIOS representation 
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• Game theory  
• Systems analysis  
• Politics of U.S. weapons procurement 
 
The paper concludes with implications drawn from the NMD case for engineering 
systems as a discipline. 
 
Technical Description and Probabilistic Analysis 
 
Technical Description 
 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles require roughly thirty minutes to reach their targets.  
For the purpose of thinking about missile defenses, flight time is divided into three 
phases: a boost phase lasting three to five minutes; a midcourse phase lasting roughly 
twenty-five minutes, when the missile coasts unpowered through inner space; and a re-
entry phase lasting less than one minute where the missile finishes its descent onto its 
target.  During the boost phase, the missile’s engines are firing, so that its heat signature 
is easily observed and tracked; moreover, while the engines are still attached, the missile 
is a larger target.  During the midcourse phase, the warheads (and any decoys) separate 
from the engines.  Distinguishing between warheads and decoys may be a challenge for 
defensive systems.  During the re-entry phase, the atmosphere separates the decoys from 
the warheads, but the warheads’ speed, and the corresponding short duration of the re-
entry phase, makes it difficult for defenses to successfully intercept targets.1 
 
Missile defenses consist of several components: 
• Early warning systems that detect launches and project the general direction of 
missile flight.  Currently, the United States detects launches with geostationary 
satellites using infra-red sensors (the Defense Support Program or DSP) and a 
group of early warning radars located in the United States and Europe. 
• Tracking radars that project an object’s trajectory sufficiently for it to be 
intercepted, and that could possibly distinguish between warheads and decoys.  
The United States plans to upgrade its early warning radars to give them tracking 
capabilities useful for missile defense and to build several additional high-
frequency (X-band) radars specifically designed for missile defense.  Some NMD 
designs also include satellites (called the Space-based infrared system or SBIRS-
low) to assist with tracking and warhead discrimination. 
• Interceptors that destroy warheads or decoys.  Several possible interceptors have 
been discussed and are in various stages of research and development, including 
missiles that would intercept targets during the midcourse phase (ground-based or 
sea-based), sea-based boost-phase interceptor missiles, lasers (either airborne or 
space-based), or space-based kinetic kill vehicles. 
                                                 
1 Presentation by Prof. Daniel Hastings, “NMD: Science, Technology, and Policy,” October 22nd, 2001; 
Sessler et al, “Countermeasures,” Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT Security Studies Study Group, April 
2000, page 19. 
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• Battle management systems that integrate the sensor information, determine 
where and when to fire interceptors, communicate with launch sites and 
commanders, and decide whether interception has been successful.2 
 
Architectures Proposed by the Clinton and Second Bush Administrations 
 
The Clinton Administration proposed an architecture built around ground-based 
interceptors that would evolve incrementally over time.  The initial system (the “C-1” 
architecture) would consist of 100 interceptors based in Alaska, upgrades to the early 
warning radars, and a single, westward-facing, X-band radar.  The initial system would 
therefore have greater capability of defending the United States from missiles launched 
eastward by countries such as North Korea, China, and Russia than from missiles 
launched westward toward the U.S.  Upgrades over time (“C-2” and “C-3” architectures) 
would add eight more X-band radars, 150 more interceptors including a second site in 
North Dakota, and SBIRS-low.3 
 
This proposal had certain advantages, as well as risks.  Advantages of the design included 
relatively low cost (roughly $20-30 billion for the C-1 system and $50-60 billion for the 
full C-3 capability), the potential to protect the United States from launches from any 
country, and the possibility that the system could comply with the 1972 Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty.  At the same time, the program faced several technological risks.  By 
picking a technical path with the aim of complying with the ABM treaty, the program 
ruled out alternate approaches, posing the risk of locking the nation into a single, 
unproven technology.  Given that this path used mid-course interceptors, it also required 
the successful development of technologies to discriminate between decoys and real 
warheads.4 
 
The second Bush Administration has re-opened the issue of NMD architecture.  To date, 
the Defense Department has not settled on a design for the system, and rather has broadly 
expanded its research and development of NMD technologies.5  Such an approach is 
more likely to limit technology risks than did the Clinton Administration’s.  At the same 
time, it will certainly require greater research and development costs, and may require 
higher procurement costs, as will be discussed below.  Reconsidering the design also may 
slow the development of a defense system, but a better system developed more slowly 
may be more valuable than a rapidly-developed but immature one.  Moreover, the 
Administration could not adopt this approach without either renegotiating or abandoning 
                                                 
2 See UCS/MIT, Countermeasures, pages 21-29; Federation of American Scientists’ Web site 
http://www.fas.org/ssp/bmd/index.html, for more detailed descriptions of system components 
3 UCS/MIT, Countermeasures, pages 19-24. 
4 UCS/MIT Countermeasures, page 25; U.S. General Accounting Office, “National Missile Defense: Risk 
and Funding Implications for the Space-Based Infrared Low Component,” GAO/NSIAD-97-16, 
(Washington D.C., U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997), pages 16-23. 
5 See, for example, discussion between Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, Director of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization, and Senator Joseph Biden, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
“The Administration’s Missile Defense Program and the ABM Treaty,” S.HRG 107-110, July 24th, 2001, 
(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Publications Office, 2001), pages 26-27. 
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the ABM Treaty; the Bush Administration announced in December 2001 that it would 
abandon the treaty as of June 2002.6   
 
Probabilistic Analysis 
 
Given some simplifying assumptions, the likelihood that a defense will destroy all targets 
(a “leak-proof” defense) can be represented by the following equation:7 
 
P = (1-(1-p)n)N where 
 
P = Probability of leak-proof defense  
p = Probability that interceptor will hit target8 
n = Number of interceptors fired at each target 
N = Number of targets 
 
One can use this equation in order to explore how effective (represented by P) are 
different technologies (represented by varying p and n) facing varying attack sizes 
(represented by N).  To the extent to which information is available, the goal of the 
system’s designers is to build a defense that would be at least ninety-five percent 
effective against a limited number (on the order of ten) of unsophisticated missiles fired 
by states such as North Korea or Iran.9   
 Figure 1: Isoperformance Combinations of p and n: N = 
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6 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON NATIONAL 
MISSILE DEFENSE,” December 13th, 2001. downloaded from 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/bushabm121301.htm.   
7 Assumptions include interceptor independence and geographic irrelevance.  Although leak-proof defense 
is only one of many possible performance metrics, it has considerable political weight; politicians would be 
hard-pressed to explain developing a system that would reduce the expected value of the number of cities 
destroyed as long as that expected value was greater than zero. 
8 UCS/MIT, Countermeasures, pages 94-102 for a discussion of the difference between p and the 
confidence one might have in the value of p. 
9 Michael Dornheim, “Missile Defense Design Juggles Complex Factors,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, February 24th, 1997, 54-56, page 55. 
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Figure 1 shows the probability that different combinations of p and n would be able to 
defend against a ten-warhead attack with no countermeasures; the second line down 
shows combinations of p and n that would be required to meet the 95% goal.  Figure 2 
shows the effectiveness of several hypothetical defenses (combinations of p and n) 
against varying attack sizes.  The figures suggest several points.  First, unless the 
interceptor is exceptionally accurate (p > 95%), it will be necessary to design defenses to 
fire more than one interceptor at each target.  Second, even if the size of an attack is on 
the order of ten targets, a defense still has a reasonable probability of being leak-proof.  
Defending against tens or hundreds of warheads, however, requires a large number of 
highly accurate interceptors, and appears infeasible given current technologies.   
 
Figure 2: Probability of Leak-Proof Defense (P) for Hypothetical 
Combinations of p and n
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For the purpose of this section and the analyses that follow, four limited attack scenarios 
were selected, reflecting a range of limited ballistic attacks that might be carried out by 
terrorists, small states such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq (the “axis of evil”), or by large 
nuclear powers such as China or Russia. 
 
• Very small, unsophisticated – two warheads, no countermeasures 
• Small, unsophisticated – five warheads, no countermeasures 
• Moderate, unsophisticated – ten warheads, no countermeasures 
• Moderate, sophisticated – ten missiles, each carrying one warhead and three 
countermeasures 
 
To counter these hypothetical attacks, it was assumed that the United States could deploy 
(in the next decade or so) five basic architectures: 10 
 
• Ground-based midcourse interceptors (100 missiles per base, destroying targets 
50% of the time, with the ability to fire up to six at each incoming object) 
5 
                                                 
10 Probabilities and rates of fire are assumed.  They are, at best, averages that encapsulate issues like 
geography, technical failures within individual components of the system, or of system integration. 
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• Sea-based midcourse interceptors (20 available missiles per ship, destroying 
targets 75% of the time, with the ability to fire up to four at each incoming 
object11 
• Both the ground-based and sea-based midcourse interceptors could be coupled 
with SBIRS satellites that are assumed to distinguish accurately between 
warheads and decoys12 
• Boost-phase interceptors, either ship-based or airborne (5 shots per platform, 
destroying targets 90% of the time, with the ability to fire up to twice at each 
missile).  Decoy-distinguishing satellites would not add value to this system. 
 
Given the set of attack scenarios, the defense assumptions, and the basic equation, one 
can calculate P values.  Table 1 shows how the five different architectures might fare 
against attacks. A graphical presentation of the probabilities was chosen, rather than a 
numerical one.  In keeping with the new homeland defense color system: 
• Green = Better than 95% chance of leak-proof defense against attack 
• Yellow = Between 75% and 95% chance 
• Orange = Between 50% and 75% chance 
• Red = Less than 50% chance 
   
Table 1 – Attack and Defense Scenarios 
Architecture Very Small Small Moderate, 
unsophisticated 
Moderate, 
sophisticated 
C-1 Green Yellow Yellow Red 
C-2 Green Yellow Yellow Yellow 
Sea-1 Green Green Orange Red 
Sea-2 Green Green Orange Orange 
Air/sea Boost Green Orange Red Red 
 
The table suggests that the five architectures are roughly equally able to defend against 
very small attacks, though there are significant differences as attacks grow larger.  The 
ground-based system is less effective than others when attacks are small.  At the same 
time, the ability to fire up to 100 interceptors means that this system is superior when 
attacks grow large.  The sea-based mid-course interceptors are more likely to hit targets 
than their land-based counterparts; the system’s performance, however, is constrained by 
the small number of available interceptors.  Boost-phase defenses are assumed to have an 
                                                 
11 The assumed difference between ship-based and ground-based missiles is that ground-based interceptors 
are intended to collide head-on with targets, while ship-based missiles could be used to hit missiles from 
the side or even behind.  The lower closing velocity of ship-based interceptors gives them greater 
maneuverability and better target recognition.  At the same time, fewer could be launched against any 
individual target because of timing constraints (and, depending upon the ship design, design constraints as 
well). 
12 If the system could distinguish, it would ignore decoys.  If it could not, decoys were assumed to be 
identical to warheads and fired at accordingly.  In Table 1, “C-1” refers to a ground-based midcourse 
system without SBIRS, and “C-2” to one with it; “Sea-1” refers to a sea-based midcourse system without 
SBIRS, while “Sea-2” refers to one with it. 
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intermediate capability to hit individual targets, and are also heavily constrained by their 
rate of fire.  
 
The analysis suggests that there are definite performance trade-offs between sea-based 
and ground-based systems, and that even without warhead/decoy discrimination 
capability, both sea-based and ground-based systems can be effective by shooting at 
everything as long as there are on the order of ten total targets.  Boost-phase systems, 
taken alone, have lower performance than their midcourse counterparts, and may 
therefore be more useful as components of a layered system than as a stand-alone 
defense.13 
  
Implications 
 
This analysis suggests that even a rudimentary probabilistic and scenario analysis 
provides considerable information to decision-makers about both the relative and 
absolute performance of missile defense systems.  Although there is considerable 
uncertainty in the estimates, there appears to be sufficient information to suggest that 
missile defense architectures should be able to defend the United States against the type 
of very limited ballistic missile attack that a “rogue” state or terrorist group might 
attempt.  At the same time, none of the first-generation systems would be effective 
against large, sophisticated attacks that Russia or even China might launch.  Finally, the 
use of a qualitative representation of efficacy seems to be better attuned to how policy-
makers might think about whether to purchase a missile defense system, or the 
implications of military scenarios that might require the system’s use, than does a 
probabilistic estimate. 
 
CLIOS Representation 
 
This section of the paper presents a partial CLIOS representation of the missile defense 
problem.14  Figure 3 shows the broad outline of the NMD system – the inter-relationship 
among the spending on missile defense by the United States, on missiles and warheads by 
others who may use them against the United States, and the performance of the NMD 
system.  The figure shows that NMD is a very tightly coupled system.  It also shows that 
some of these relationships are clear: greater spending on NMD will improve the 
performance of the system, while greater spending on missiles and countermeasures by 
opponents will degrade it.  At the same time, other relationships are less certain.  For 
example, will a missile defense system encourage opponents to spend more to develop 
weapons of mass destruction, or deter them and cause them to spend less? 
 
 
                                                 
13 The system analysis below compares boost-midcourse combinations with midcourse-only and boost-only 
systems. 
14 CLIOS representation follows Joseph Sussman and Rebecca Dodder, “The Concept of a ‘CLIOS’ 
Analysis Illustrated by the Mexico City Case,” Engineering Systems Division Symposium, May 2002.  
This section primarily performs steps 3-5 of the CLIOS process, while other sections of the paper perform 
several of the other steps.  CLIOS is less quantitative than other systems approaches like system dynamics. 
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Figure 3 – Top-Level CLIOS Representation 
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Expanding the NMD Performance Box 
 
One way of thinking about NMD as a system is to consider how information 
(communications between operators, detection of missiles, etc.) flows through it.  As an 
example, Figure 4 shows how components of a ground-based NMD system are likely to 
inter-connect and communicate, as well as how the components contribute to evaluation 
of the system’s performance.15  The requirement that a large, distributed number of 
system elements correctly identify and respond to missile launches under extreme time 
pressure suggests that emergent behavior, as well as the failure of individual components 
or the overwhelming of the system by a massive number of targets, could degrade system 
performance.  While the potential for emergence depends upon NMD’s design, there 
appears to be three likely classes of emergent behavior that might degrade performance: 
 
• Mistaken identification of launches 
• Erroneous targeting 
• Command confusion 
 
Mistaken identity errors could take several forms.  Mistaking a missile test or satellite 
launch for an attack against the United States could lead to the system destroying a target 
or targets that it should not have.16  Such a type 2 error17 might be a public relations 
nightmare for the NMD program, but American lives would not be lost as a result.  In 
addition, it may be the easiest error to prevent.  There are already protocols for 
notification when launching missiles or other space-bound objects; the responsibility 
should countries fail to adhere to these protocols in an NMD environment would be 
shared, if not falling squarely upon the launching nation. 
 
A variation on the mistaken identity problem would be the inability to identify ballistic 
missile launches during an active conflict.  Especially were the United States engaged 
with a country of modest size such as North Korea, sensors would be seeing a large 
number of potential attacks emanating from a limited geographic area; NMD sensors and 
operators would need to distinguish anti-aircraft missile launches, explosions, or even 
decoy launches from true threats.  Mistakenly targeting false launches, or ignoring true 
ones, would be a larger problem for boost-phase systems than for midcourse designs; 
                                                 
15 Different NMD architectures would vary Figure 4 somewhat.  Ship-based systems integrate 
communications with the interceptor and tracking into the launch platform; airborne lasers integrate early 
warning and tracking into the launch platform.  Each architecture therefore contains slightly different 
possibilities for emergence. 
16 Russia nearly launched missiles in 1995, fearing a Norwegian scientific experiment was actually a 
nuclear missile.  See Joseph Anselmo, “Russian Threat Still Massive,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, February 24th, 1997, pages 48-49, page 49; Geoffrey Forden relates another story of mistaken 
identity, from the early days of the Soviet space-based tracking network.  Geoffrey Forden, “Russia’s Early 
Warning System: Which Came First, Technology or Doctrine?” Breakthroughs 10(1) Spring 2001, 11-20, 
14-15.  The United States has also had its share of false alarms.  See “Report of Senate Gary Hart and 
Senator Barry Goldwater to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,” Senate Report 80 S202-5, 
October 9th, 1980 (Washington D.C., U.S. GPO, 1980), 4-5. 
17 Type 1 error = false negative; type 2 error = false positive 
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boost-phase designs operate under greater time pressure and rely on fewer independent 
sensors.  
 
Figure 4 – NMD Performance Expanded – Midcourse Ground-based Interceptor 
Architecture 
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A second type of emergent behavior is for subtle errors in the computer software 
underlying the system to cause the system to function “correctly” but fail to intercept 
targets.  An example would be for the interceptor’s onboard sensors to identify debris or 
decoys (rather than warheads) as the real targets.  This possibility is more significant for 
midcourse systems than for boost-phase designs.  Critics of NMD development have 
argued that the discrimination problem is the Achilles heel of midcourse systems.  The 
basic equation assumes that the probability that an interceptor will hit its target is 
independent of the number of targets, but one would imagine that the likelihood of 
incorrect targeting increases with the number of targets.18  Depending upon the final 
design of the battle management system, errors caused by mistaken targeting stemming 
from “correct” system operation might significantly affect system performance. 
 
A final concern is that even were the sensors and battle management systems to function 
perfectly, the humans who decide whether or not to fire might misinterpret data or react 
too slowly for the system to be effective.  For example, an attack “from the blue” of one 
or two missiles, launched at a time when worldwide tensions were relatively low, could 
potentially confuse operators.  The infra-red sensors and early-warning radars are very 
sensitive devices, and must correctly distinguish infrequent missile launches from other 
heat sources and radar returns.  The history of early-warning systems includes examples 
of mistaken warnings of missile attacks; human operators provide an additional level of 
judgment to prevent type 2 errors.  At the same time, the level of discrimination and 
redundant operating procedures required for error prevention creates the possibility that a 
cleverly designed attack would fool the system, slowing reaction time to the point where 
defenses could not be successfully brought to bear.19 
 
Implications 
 
Scrutinizing the NMD design for potential emergent behavior shows an example of 
nested complexity in the NMD system.  Arms races may contribute to a decline in 
performance of a missile defense over and above the multiplication of potential targets 
because they increase the likelihood of NMD emergent behavior taking the form of 
mistaken identity or erroneous targeting.  Such behavior undermines the assumptions 
underlying the basic equation, and suggests that the equation overestimates the likelihood 
of leak-proof defense as attacks grow large.  One way to counter these emergent 
                                                 
18 See UCS/MIT, Countermeasures Chapter 10.  The authors argue that considerable testing of the system 
would increase confidence in its ability to handle large numbers of targets and varying types of decoys, but 
the current testing program is considerably more limited. 
19 The analogy here is to the September 11th bombings.  The air traffic control system detected hijackings of 
several planes, but no one believed that they would be used to crash into buildings.  Even after the first 
plane crashed into the World Trade Center (a clear indication that an attack was underway), there was 
insufficient time for defenses to respond to prevent the second WTC and Pentagon attacks.  Given that a 
five-minute delay renders boost-phase defenses impotent, and a delay of fifteen to twenty minutes might 
circumvent a mid-course defense, a blue-sky attack does pose a concern.  Circumstances that might 
contribute to the success of a blue-sky attack include attacking from unexpected locations (ship-based 
missiles or terrorists launching from countries without known missile programs) or launching just after new 
sensors become operational (while operators are learning to distinguish signals from noise).  This concern 
was the focus of an organizational analysis that could not be included in the final version of this paper due 
to space constraints. 
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behaviors is to develop a layered defense based on multiple technologies.  A layered 
design, as compared with a system built around a single technology, limits the influence 
of any particular emergent behavior.     
 
Without precise understanding of how potential opponents might react to an NMD 
system, the systems perspective is excellent at highlighting the potential for feedback and 
for working through the consequences of choice but is less able to project what those 
choices are likely to be.  A broad conclusion that may be drawn from the CLIOS analysis 
is that NMD decreases the likelihood of small, unsophisticated attacks against the United 
States, but increases the likelihood of more complex ones.  While the probability 
distribution of successful missile attacks against the United States is unknowable, it 
would not be surprising if NMD decreased the mean (first moment) of that distribution 
while increasing its skew (third moment).   
 
Game Theory 
 
Game theory provides an alternative approach to representing inter-dependent decisions 
such as those that are involved in missile defense.  Consider two games, shown as 
Figures 5 and 6.  The first represents whether the United States should develop a missile 
defense in order to protect against missile launches against rogue states or terrorist 
groups.  The second represents how the outcome of the first game might be viewed by 
China, and the decisions that the Chinese government might make based upon the United 
States’ approach to missile defense.20 
 
The Rogue State Game 
 
This game assumes that potential adversaries of the United States are several years away 
from developing the capability to launch ballistic missile attacks with nuclear warheads, 
and that therefore the United States could develop defenses at least as rapidly as rogues 
could develop missiles.  The result of the game depends upon a key unknown – whether 
the leaders of rogue states would choose to launch missiles at the United States, knowing 
that retaliation would be severe.  U.S. deterrence worked during the Gulf War, but the 
characterization of these states as “rogues” or members of an “axis of evil” suggests that 
the United States believes that their leaders might be willing to attack America in some 
circumstances despite the likelihood of massive retaliation.  Given that assumption, the 
game suggests several points: 
 
• In the absence of defenses, some rogues might attack the United States with 
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 
• American R&D (which signals our intent to develop NMD if necessary) would 
not deter rogues from pursuing their own missile/nuclear weapons programs. 
                                                 
20 It is assumed that Russia, which maintains a considerable nuclear capability and has developed 
sophisticated missile defense countermeasures, would be able to defeat a limited system regardless of its 
design, and was therefore not included in either game.  See Countermeasures, pages 5-9. 
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• Missile defenses, therefore, would be necessary to guard against this 
contingency.21 
Figure 5 – Rogue State Game 
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Notes: 
In reading the games, remember that the numbers are speculative, although the choices are real. 
 
Boxes = U.S. decisions; circles = rogues’ decisions 
Numbers in boxes/circles: branch of tree chosen (1 = top, etc.) 
Parentheses denote value of each branch, using format (U.S., rogue) 
Value assumptions for U.S.: Cost of R&D = $15 billion; cost of 1st generation system = $30 billion; cost of 
2nd generation system = $60 billion; cost if missile hits U.S. = $1000 billion.  Probability that 1st 
generation system defends against simple attack or 2nd generation defends against complex attack = 90% 
 
Value assumptions for rogues: Cost of developing nuclear weapon = $1 billion; cost of developing nuclear 
weapons and countermeasures = $2 billion; value of attacking United States even if United States responds 
= positive; value increases if attack is complex.
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21 Alternatively, the United States could pre-emptively destroy rogue states’ ballistic missile/nuclear 
weapons programs.   
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A second key unknown, however, is whether the equilibrium between offense and 
defense would be stable.  Critics of NMD have argued that even rogue states might be 
able to overwhelm limited defenses by developing relatively sophisticated yet 
inexpensive countermeasures.22  The topmost branch of the game tree shows this 
possibility.  The possibility of countermeasures suggests that the United States may be 
forced to develop ever more sophisticated defensive systems to counter relatively 
inexpensive threats, with the overall outcome of the game unclear.23 
 
The China Game 
 
The China game depends upon the recognition of the relationship between first-strike and 
second-strike capabilities.  A missile defense capable of defending the United States 
against rogue states also gives the U.S. the freedom to use a small fraction of its own 
nuclear weapons against China’s nuclear forces.  The United States could rely upon 
missile defenses to stop the small fraction of Chinese missiles that survived a first strike 
and still threaten China with nuclear devastation.  This game suggests several points: 
 
• Were the United States not worried about rogues, the rational decision would be 
not to develop missile defenses, in which case China would not expand its missile 
force. 
• Combining the two games (figure not shown), however, suggests that the United 
States should build a missile defense, which leads to an arms race. 
• The common expansion would return the two countries to roughly the same state 
of vulnerability, but would now give China greater capability to strike other 
nations than it now has. 
• The rest of the world might consider the overall shift in weapons procurement 
stemming from a U.S. decision to deploy NMD as increasing risks rather than 
decreasing them.  The most likely spill-over would be continuing development of 
nuclear technologies by India and Pakistan. 24 
 
                                                 
22 See, for example, UCS/MIT, Countermeasures, pages xx-xxi and 39-48. 
23 Moreover, this game covers only missile technologies.  The game suggests that by pursuing missile 
defenses, the United States may lead rogue states to spend a larger fraction of their defense budgets on 
ballistic missile technology and less on other forces.  Whether such a choice would make U.S. friends and 
allies more secure also is not clear. 
24 As a result, large investments by a coalition of nuclear states in preventing rogues from developing 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction improve the game outcome for all of them.  Alternatively, the 
other nuclear powers could try to convince the United States that it misunderstands the psychology of the 
“rogue” states, and that they, too, are deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation.  Successful change in our 
perception would also prevent the arms race.  But the no-NMD equilibrium is highly unstable.  
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Figure 6 – China Game 
 
otes: 
.S. decisions; circles = China’s decisions 
 top, etc.) 
hina) 
on; cost if one missile hits U.S. = 
ends 
alue assumptions for China: Cost of expanding nuclear weapons = $10 billion; cost if U.S. first strike hits 
China retaliates
US 1st strike (-1055, -105)
1
No retaliation
Chinese expand (-55, -110)
2
No US first strike
Deploy 2nd. Gen. NMD (-60, -10)
1 China retaliates
(-55, -95)
US 1st strike
1
Chinese do not No retaliation
(-55, -100)
1
No US first strike
(-60, 0)
2
China retaliates
US first strike (-4995, -105)
1
No retaliation
Chinese expand (5, -110)
2
No US first strike
(0, -10)
Do not Deploy NMD
2
China retaliates
US first strike (-995, -95)
1
No retaliation
Chinese do not (0, -100)
2
No US first strike
(0,0)
N
Boxes = U
Numbers in boxes/circles: branch of tree chosen (1 =
Parentheses denote value of each branch, using format (U.S., C
Value assumptions for U.S.: cost of 2nd generation system = $60 billi
$1000 billion; cost if ten missiles hit U.S. = $5000 billion; political benefit of first strike = $5 billion; 
probability that 2nd generation defends against ten missiles = 90%; probability that 2nd generation def
against one missile = 100%.  
 
V
China = $100 billion; political benefit of responding to U.S. first strike = $5. 
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Implications 
 
Game theory is different from systems approaches like CLIOS or system dynamics in its 
explicit representation of choice, and its associated solution algorithm of looking forward 
and reasoning backward.  CLIOS and system dynamics, on the other hand, are better able 
to represent feedback loops and complex behavior (as they represents behavior as a series 
of flows), but rely on simulation and sensitivity analysis to determine where equilibria 
lie. The game theory approach is better than CLIOS at focusing on specific aspects of a 
broad problem, but that advantage diminishes as games become more complex.  While 
the individual rogue and China games are easy to analyze, incorporating third countries’ 
decisions or broad trade-offs between the risks associated with ballistic missiles and more 
conventional weapons lead to games just as complicated as CLIOS representations. 
 
A second implication of this approach is that it assumes that all players adopt the same 
decision-making framework – economic maximizers who look forward and reason 
backward.  The rogue state game, especially, suggests that actors on the world stage do 
not necessarily think in this fashion.  First, decision rules may not be based on 
conventional conceptions of utility maximization.  Second and more generally, policy-
makers with very short time horizons may not look all the way forward to the end of a 
game, leading to sub-optimal strategic choices and outcomes.   
 
Systems Analysis 
 
This section couples estimates of hypothetical NMD systems’ performance with 
estimates of cost.  This systems analysis performs several functions: 
 
• Ruling out inefficient or dominated approaches 
• Focusing on the trade-offs between comparable approaches, and 
• Suggesting potential expansion paths for a system 
 
Table 2 describes the potential NMD architectures that were included in the system 
analysis.25  The system analysis combined cost data from Table 2 with effectiveness 
estimates calculated using the missile defense equation.  It also included combinations of 
architectures (boost-phase and midcourse; ground-based midcourse and sea-based 
midcourse) as well as analyzing individual systems.  Table 3 shows a simplified version 
of the analysis results.  It removes those potential architectures that are dominated by 
                                                 
25 The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of several in a 2002 report, and it is possible to 
extrapolate the costs of similar systems using the CBO data to estimate the marginal cost of additional ships 
or missiles.  See Congressional Budget Office, “Letter to the Honorable Tom Daschle”, January 31st, 2002, 
and Congressional Budget Office, “BUDGETARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE,” April 2000.  CBO has not 
estimated the costs of boost-phase defenses; for simplicity, the cost of a ship-based boost-phase defense 
was assumed to be comparable to that of a ship-based midcourse system.  The ABL estimates were derived 
from General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-37.  While the estimated costs shown here are higher 
than Defense Department estimates, note that official estimates have often underestimated costs.  See for 
example Stanley Kandebo, “U.S. Pursues NMD System to Prepare for ‘Rogue’ Threat,” Aviation Week and 
Space Technology March 3rd, 1997, 44-45.  
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other systems offering similar or better performance at lower cost.  Table 3 suggests 
several points: 
 
• The Clinton Administration approach to missile defense looks relatively cost-
effective when compared with the Bush Administration approach.   
• Ship-based mid-course missile defense and ABL approaches appear to be worth 
researching, despite their relatively high cost. Their greatest utility lies in that they 
provide an alternative to developing space-based tracking sensors, which have 
already fallen behind schedule.26  Combining ground-based midcourse systems 
with either ship-based midcourse systems or ABL would provide nearly 
equivalent performance to the full-fledged C-3 ground-based system at similar 
cost, and better performance than the C-2 system at 10-20% higher cost.27 
 
Table 2 – Potential System Designs and Costs 
 
 
Architecture 
 
 
Interceptors 
SBIRS 
Tracking 
Satellites? 
Cost to 
2015 (2001 
B$) 
Earliest 
Deployment 
Date 
Threshold  20 ground-based missiles at 1 site No 21.0 2005 
C-1 100 ground-based missiles at 1 site No 23.5 2007 
C-2 100 ground-based missiles at 1 site Yes 45.3 2009 
C-3 250 ground-based missiles at 2 sites Yes 55.5 2010 
Sea-1 8 ships carrying midcourse missiles No 34.8 2010 
Sea-2 8 ships carrying midcourse missiles Yes 48.8 2010 
Sea-3 16 ships carrying midcourse missiles No 48.1 2015 
Sea-4 8 ships carrying boost-phase missiles No 34.8 2010 
Sea-5 16 ships carrying boost-phase missiles No 48.1 2015 
 
ABL-1 
7 planes carrying lasers that destroy 
boosting missiles 
 
No 
 
25.0 
 
2010 
ABL-2 14 planes carrying lasers No 38.8 2015 
Space-based Lasers/kill vehicles in orbit No 63.0 2020 
 
Table 3 suggests a cost-effective research and procurement path.  In the short term, the 
Bush Administration should decide to purchase a limited ground-based system.  While 
limited ground-based defenses are being developed and built, the Administration should 
continue research into air-based and sea-based systems and satellite tracking 
technologies.  If it becomes necessary to purchase missile defenses that can deal with 
more sophisticated attacks, the Administration should purchase the most cost-effective of 
planes, ships or satellites.  Such a procurement plan would buy a first-generation system 
that would cost approximately $30 billion through 2015.  Were the decision made to go 
ahead with a second-generation defense, the costs would roughly double. 
                                                 
26 See GAO/NSIAD-97-16, “National Missile Defense: Risk and Funding Implications for the Space-Based 
Infrared Low Component”; also see Robert Wall and David Fulghum, “Military Budget Boost Yields 
Marginal Change,” http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020211/aw24.htm. 
27 At the same time, the combination of X-band radars and space-based sensors envisioned for the C-2 and 
C-3 systems could be necessary were the threat more complicated. 
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Table 3 – Dominant Systems, Costs, and Effectiveness28 
   Effectiveness Against Attack Size: 
Architecture 
Cost to 
2015 (2001 
B$) 
Earliest 
Deployment 
Date 
Very 
Small Small 
Moderate, 
unsophisticated 
Moderate, 
sophisticated 
Threshold 21.0 2005 Green Orange Red Red 
C-1 23.5 2007 Green Yellow Yellow Red 
Sea-1 34.8 2010 Green Green Orange Red 
C-2 45.3 2009 Green Yellow Yellow Yellow 
C-1 + ABL-1 48.5 2010 Green Green Yellow Orange 
Threshold + Sea-1 51.8 2010 Green Green Green Orange 
C-1 + Sea-1 54.3 2010 Green Green Green Yellow 
C-3 55.5 2010 Green Green Green Green 
 
At the same time, this conclusion depends on historical accident – the Clinton 
Administration’s decision to research ground-based defenses to a greater extent than 
other approaches.  Sunk costs make ground-based defenses appear to be less expensive 
than their counterparts, thereby improving cost-effectiveness trade-offs.  The Clinton 
Administration spent approximately $6 billion on research into the ground-based segment 
of NMD between FY 1997 and FY 2001, as opposed to just under $2 billion for sea-
based and $1 billion for airborne lasers.29  Had the Clinton Administration not built its 
architecture around ABM compliance, the cost-effective expansion path might have 
looked different. 
 
Implications 
 
Compared with the other engineering tools, this one is most narrowly focused.  Unlike 
either the systems or game theory approaches, it assumes that missile defense is a 
worthwhile objective, and discovers which architectures are likely to be cost-effective.  
Like game theory, system analysis assumes rationality as a goal of policy-making, as well 
                                                 
28 System costs for layered missile-based systems were assumed to cost $4 billion less than the sum of 
individual costs (half of sea-based system R&D) because of savings from shared research.  No overlap was 
assumed between ABL and missile-based systems. 
29 Statement of Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, USAF Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, April 22, 1998,  
http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/70918b.pdf; Statement of Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, 
USAF Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization before the House Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee, March 24th, 1999, http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/lyle24mar99.html; 
Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,  April 12, 2000, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/kadish12apr00.html; BMDO Press Release, FY 01 
President's Budget, February 4th, 2000, http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/bmdopress.pdf;  
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), RDT&E Programs (R-1), 
FY 2001, February 2000,  http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2001budget/fy2001r1.pdf;  
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), RDT&E Programs (R-1), 
FY 99, February 1998, http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy1999budget/r1unclas.pdf 
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as the approach to it.  It is easy to observe from the history of research into NMD that 
micro-economic rationality has not been a strong influence on decision-making.  From a 
technology development standpoint, it would have been best to begin researching a wide 
variety of technologies and then choose the most cost-effective among them for 
deployment.  The Clinton and second Bush Administrations have reversed the approach – 
Clinton choosing to define the architecture and technology narrowly, with Bush choosing 
to re-open the competition among systems just as one had emerged as an effective design.  
This is just one facet of the differences between the politics of weapons procurement and 
the projections of traditional decision theory and engineering analyses, as will be 
explored in the next section. 
 
Political Analysis 
 
The politics of weapon system development suggests a very different evolution for NMD 
than do the more traditional engineering systems analyses.  Before projecting the future 
of missile defense, it is useful to touch briefly on how the United States purchases 
weapons, and on broad political trends surrounding the defense budget in general and 
missile defense in particular. 
 
General Trends 
 
At the end of the Cold War, observers expected the U.S. defense budget to shrink rapidly 
to match the declining threat from the Soviet Union.  Yet during the 1990s, the defense 
budget remained at nearly ninety percent of Cold War levels.  One reason for the 
continued high level of spending was that military planners successfully argued that a 
large force was necessary for the United States to deal with two regional wars such as 
Desert Storm simultaneously.  At the same time, Congress, the armed services, and the 
Defense Department chose to budget in a fashion that minimized political conflicts but 
increased the cost of defense.30 
 
One hallmark of 1990s weapons procurement has been the continuation of projects with 
strong political support but limited military rationale.  Congress has resisted the closing 
of bases and production lines, resulting in purchases of weapons for which the services 
have not asked and maintaining a duplicative and inefficient infrastructure.31  Each 
service retains roughly the same percentage of the military budget as it did during the 
Cold War, despite the change in threats and likely deployments.  Cost savings came from 
across-the-board reductions of personnel and military formations rather than from radical 
re-orientations.  Similarly, the services have chosen to purchase fewer units of new 
weapons rather than completely eliminate entire systems.32  Even though the military 
talked during the 1990s about a “revolution in military affairs” that would radically 
                                                 
30 Cindy Williams, ed., Holding the Line, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001): chapter 2, 40-45. 
31 Sapolsky, “Buying Weapons Without an Enemy,” Breakthroughs 10(1), Spring 2001, 34-44, 36-38; 
Holding the Line, chapter 3. 
32 Holding the Line, chapter 2, 44-46. 
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transform the services, spending on revolutionary activities has been limited, representing 
an incremental increase in spending rather than a new blueprint for it.33 
 
Looking at general political trends, strong public support for the war on terrorism not 
only gives politicians the incentive to support the increases in defense budgets that would 
allow the services to add new programs like missile defense without trading off existing 
ones, but also concerns over terrorism provide a rationale for missile defense – airplanes 
today, missiles tomorrow.34  Defense may re-emerge as a partisan issue in the run-up to 
the 2004 election; Democratic control over the White House after 2004 may limit the 
move toward second-generation defenses. 
  
At the same time, programs begun today lead to procurement decisions tomorrow.  The 
Defense Department projects that spending will rise from $331 billion in fiscal year 2002 
to $451 billion by fiscal year 2007, while procurement spending will rise from $61 billion 
in FY 2002 to $99 billion in FY 2007.35  Current missile defense spending of roughly $8 
billion already represents more than two percent of the defense budget, and nearly one-
sixth of the defense R&D budget.  Concerns over spending are likely to mount, however, 
as procurement intensifies; even the cost-effective spending proposal generated through 
systems analysis represents approximately ten percent of the total procurement budget 
between 2007 and 2010, and more than three percent of the total defense budget.  This 
level of costs, while seemingly manageable, is approximately comparable to the cost of 
the Polaris missile submarine, probably the best example of an innovative, well-run, 
highly-successful weapons acquisition program. Even in the three years when Polaris 
R&D spending was highest, it represented no more than ten percent of the R&D budget, 
and Polaris exceeded three percent of the defense budget for only three years.36   
 
The current plans of the Bush Administration, however, call for development of a layered 
defense that would encompass ship-based, airborne, and space-based defenses as well as 
ground-based interceptors; were all of the systems developed and then purchased, actual 
spending would be considerably higher than three percent of the defense budget.37  
Moreover, procurement of NMD will occur at the same time as when the services will be 
purchasing the next generation of ships and aircraft.38  Especially should the economy fail 
to improve to the extent projected and deficits continue into the future, missile defenses 
                                                 
33 Holding the Line, chapter 1, 2-3; note that even the FY 2003 defense budget appears to follow the pattern 
of incremental change, albeit at a much higher funding level.  See Cindy Williams, “The Bush Defense 
Budget: In With the Old in 2003,” Newsday, February 3rd, 2002. 
34 Conversation with Cindy Williams, February 20th, 2002. 
35 U.S. Department of Defense, “Details Of Fiscal 2003 Department Of Defense (DoD) Budget Request,” 
News Release 049-02, February 4th, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/b02042002_bt049-
02.html.  As a comparison, the Clinton Administration FY 2000 budget projected FY 2005 defense 
spending of $333 billion and FY 2007 spending of $357 billion.  See Congressional Research Service, 
“Appropriations for 2000: Defense,” CRS Report RL30205, July 1999, 
http://www.senate.gov/~dpc/crs/reports/00_approps/RL30205.pdf, Tables 2, 4.  
36 Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972): vii.  
Calculations estimated from pages 166, 169, 172. 
37 Compare CRS Table 5 with DoD Details of Budget Request, Testimony of Lt. General Ronald Kadish 
before the House Armed Services Committee, February 27th, 2002. 
38 Conversation with Cindy Williams, February 20th, 2002. 
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are likely to be purchased in an atmosphere of budgetary stringency and intense 
competition for resources with other defense priorities. 
 
Implications for Missile Defense as a System 
 
The politics of weapons procurement and missile defense suggest several predictions for 
missile defense as a system.   
 
• The large funding increases for missile defense in the FY 2002 and 2003 budgets 
will lead to the development and eventual procurement of airborne and sea-based 
missile defenses, in addition to ground-based interceptors.  The pressure for 
procurement will stem from three sources. 
o Because of the war on terrorism, Congressional oversight of the defense 
budget after September 11th is likely to be weaker until war ends, giving 
the Defense Department more autonomy to speed research and 
development.39 
o Once components have been developed, there will be pressure from 
Congress and contractors to purchase them (the “camel’s nose under the 
tent”). 
o The armed services are likely to prefer flexible systems such as airborne 
lasers and AEGIS ships that both function as national missile defenses and 
meet the services’ other mission requirements to dedicated national 
missile defense components such as ground-based interceptors.40 
• The addition of components to the missile defense architecture will complicate 
the task of system integration and cause cost increases. 
• At the same time, budgetary pressures at the end of the decade will limit spending 
for NMD system components. 
o Congress will buy fewer pieces of each interceptor system or 
radar/satellite system than the architecture requires. 
o Testing programs will be limited, and realistic testing highly unlikely. 
o NMD, despite being a high priority of the current Secretary of Defense, 
will not be able to generate the reputation for excellence that can protect 
high-profile projects from scrutiny and budget cuts.41 
• All this being said, the United States probably will field a limited defense against 
ballistic missiles by the end of the decade. 
o It will probably be roughly as capable as the Clinton Administration C-1 
architecture. 
o It will be more costly, and probably will take longer to build. 
                                                 
39 Conversation with Robert Dare, February 6th, 2002. 
40 Conversation with Robert Dare, February 6th, 2002. 
41 See Sapolsky, the Polaris System Development, chapter 8 for lessons for successfully managing weapons 
system development programs.  NMD programs have already faced considerable scrutiny from 
Congressional support agencies like the General Accounting Office (for example NSIAD-97-16, NSIAD-
98-37, NSIAD-98-153, NSIAD-00-121, NSIAD-00-131) and Congressional Budget Office.  Moreover, the 
ideologically charged nature of missile defense has made it controversial in the past, and likely will 
continue to do so in the future. 
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o It will be more reliable in some ways (multiple interceptor technologies 
with less-dependent failure modes) but may also be less reliable in others 
(system integration, limited sensors). 
 
Implications 
 
Comparing the political analysis with the engineering-based analyses above highlights 
the differences between a “traditional” decision theory or economics approach and the 
more nuanced view that engineering systems provides.  CLIOS and its cousins are in one 
sense the closest of the engineering tools to the political approach.  Policy-makers at least 
implicitly carry systems diagrams such as the CLIOS representations shown in Figures 3-
4 in their heads.  Individual policy-makers focus on small parts of the system under their 
jurisdiction, and treat other pieces as constraints on their activities.  At the same time, 
CLIOS (and other systems approaches to an even larger extent) imply that while the 
world is complex, it is also continuous.  Choices by policy-makers – events such as 
September 11th or the switch of the Senate from Republican to Democratic control – are 
represented as changes in signs or quantities of parameters, hiding the human element.   
 
Game theory’s assumption of value-maximizing rationality both ignores the way in 
which policy-makers choose and hides the most important questions for analysis.  Few 
policy-makers, at least in the United States, have an interest in looking all the way 
forward to the end of a game before reasoning backward; given the tenure of elected 
officials, short-term maximization is a better description.  Moreover, the key variable in 
the rogue state game is the value function of individuals such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein 
or North Korea’s Kim Jong Il.  By definition, such leaders are assumed not to be rational 
value-maximizers.  Yet in the absence of a rationality assumption, it becomes impossible 
to project whether or under what circumstances they would use such weapons against the 
United States, making reasoning backward quite difficult. 
 
The economic and technical calculus underlying system analysis assumes a politics-free 
decision-making process.  If only analysts could represent the value of a program as a 
single goal (defending the United States against ballistic missiles) and compare 
performance against cost, they could make cost-effective choices.  Yet in the case of 
missile defense several goals are at stake in addition to homeland defense – the health of 
defense contractors, inter-service rivalries, party politics, and public confidence in U.S. 
security.  Given that these goals cannot be quantified to the extent that cost or even 
projected performance can, let alone mathematically traded off against each other, 
systems analysis cannot develop cost-effectiveness curves.  Systems analysis therefore 
only provides a goal toward which policy-makers can strive, as long as they recognize 
how and why they will fall short. 
 
Conclusion: Engineering Systems Principles 
 
This paper suggests two principles that should be incorporated into analyzing and 
especially teaching engineering systems: 
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• A taxonomy of tools 
• The quantitative may be the enemy of the good 
 
A taxonomy of tools.  The analyses above show that applying multiple tools to the NMD 
problem yield different answers regarding how the system should be designed, how it is 
likely to perform, and the fundamental issues designers face.  Figure 7, though 
speculative, offers one way of thinking about the question of tool selection that NMD 
illustrates.  Agency – the extent to which individual human decisions about a system can 
perturb its trajectory – is one way of characterizing engineering systems problems and 
analytical tools.  At one extreme, “natural” systems such as the solar system, weather, or 
undisturbed ecosystems, agency is absent.  The evolution of these systems can be 
described (and if the equations are linear, accurately predicted) using differential 
equations and modeled using tools such as system dynamics.  At the other extreme, 
individual decisions by policy-makers drive the system.  To understand high-agency 
systems, political and organizational analysis is vital.  Mathematical tools like game 
theory or systems analysis may help to structure choices or illuminate possibilities, but 
they will never be sufficient to predict the performance of, or even fully describe, the 
system. 
Figure 7 -- Taxonomy of Tools Along Agency Axis
CLIOS
Tools:
Organization theory
Systems analysis
Game theory System dynamics
Operations research
Political analysis
Agency
Level:
Critical Moderate Small None
Examples: NMD Airport operations U.S. economy Ecosystems
Soviet Economy c. 1930 Manufacturing processes Evolution of mega-cities Weather
 
 
NMD represents an extreme case of divergence between the predictions of engineering 
systems tools, because of the importance of agency in this case.  Missile defense is an 
issue over which Democrats and Republicans clash; changes in Congress or the 
presidency play a significant role in determining the shape of the program.  Other world 
leaders may ignore or even actively counter any missile defense, and crises may reshape 
the perception of the missile threat, leading to a broad spectrum of potential responses 
that limits the insights of tools such as game theory or system dynamics.  Finally, the 
very short time-frame in which defenses operate focuses attention on organizational 
questions. 
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Nevertheless, the applicability of the assertion that there is no single “best” tool applies to 
issues other than NMD.  For example, the question of how a car company should run its 
factories or manage its global supply chain is the bread-and-butter of operations research.  
At the same time, the question of which car models and how many of each that company 
should build may be better understood using game theory or organizational analysis; 
operations research may help to bound choices and identify likely outcomes, but 
decision-makers are unlikely to rely solely upon them.  Thinking through the extent to 
which human agency plays a role in the problem at hand helps in choosing suitable 
analytical tools. 
 
The quantitative may be the enemy of the good.  A key role that engineering systems 
practitioners play is to act as interpreters between decision-makers, whose training is 
likely to be in fields such as law or economics, and technologists.  A brilliantly conceived 
and executed engineering study that does not resonate with decision-makers may be a 
technical success, but is an engineering systems failure.  Expression of complex ideas in 
non-technical language, with the help of simple visual aids, is (or at least should be) an 
engineering systems core skill. 
 
This principle is important in the NMD example because the rhetoric used by politicians 
to promote missile defense creates high expectations for the program.  To the extent to 
which analysis can play any role in the debate over the program, the greatest value in 
engineering systems analyses at this point in time is to illuminate, using ideas policy-
makers can understand and relate to, the relationship between the goal of a leak-proof 
defense and likely actual performance.  Whether or not the probability analysis developed 
as the first part of this paper is sufficient technically, qualitative representations of results 
such as those developed here may be crucial in educating non-technical policy-makers in 
the strengths, weaknesses, and trade-offs associated with pursuing missile defenses. 
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